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How Cool is C.O.O.L.? 
 
1. Introduction 
The incidence of foodborne diseases has dramatically increased in the past fifteen years in 
the United States and in other industrialized countries. According to the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC 2004), foodborne infections in the United States annually cause 
approximately 76 million illnesses, costing $23 billion per year. Widely publicized outbreaks 
such as “Mad Cow” disease (Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy or BSE), avian influenza 
(“bird flu”) and the contamination of animal feed with cancer-causing dioxin and polychlorinated 
biphenyls (PCBs) have led to greater consumer awareness of potential food hazards and 
increased consumer demand for safer products. Concomitantly, these outbreaks have triggered 
national revisions in trade policies. The efficacy of these policy responses is the focus of this 
research. 
The imposition of temporary import bans has been one response. BSE outbreaks resulted 
in a spate of such bans in 2003. A virtually worldwide ban on Canadian beef exports followed 
the May 20, 2003 announcement that a single breeder cow in Alberta had tested positive for 
BSE.  By August, Canada’s beef export market had dwindled from $4.1 billion annually to near 
zero. In less than ten days following the December 23, 2003 diagnosis of a BSE case in the 
United States, over 30 countries had banned US imports, including Japan, traditionally the 
largest buyer of American beef. More recently, outbreaks of bird flu in Delaware and Texas 
prompted the European Union to ban imports of poultry from the United States. Country-of-
origin labeling (COOL) is another policy measure addressing the problem of potentially unsafe 
food imports. COOL allows consumers to differentiate products that may embody different 
health risks as a consequence of the uneven geographical origins of foodborne diseases. Japan 
has mandated a COOL for all meat imports since 1997. In the U.S., the 2002 Food Security and 
Rural Investment Act called for voluntary COOL on September 30, 2002 and mandatory COOL 
by September 30, 2004 for a number of food products such as beef, pork, fresh fruit and 
vegetables (Federal Register 2003). Recently, Congress approved a two-year delay for COOL 
implementation.  
Juxtaposed against the emotional intensity that often surrounds health-related issues and 
the sometimes extreme measures that have been implemented to deal with foodborne diseases in   2
particular, is a relatively scant literature analyzing the economics of trade policy in risky food-
products. Many questions remain unanswered. From an economic welfare perspective, are trade 
embargoes rational when there is a food safety concern? Perhaps under some circumstances but 
not others? What are the welfare effects of policies such as COOL? Should a COOL be 
augmented by traditional protectionist trade policy instruments (e.g., tariffs)?   
Product safety, and in particular food safety, issues have been analyzed theoretically and 
empirically, but primarily in the context of closed-economy, partial-equilibrium models.
1 In the 
international context, there are three related literatures. First, considerable attention has been 
given to product quality and government intervention to help exporters overcome informational 
barriers that impede foreign market entry (in particular, adverse country-of-origin reputations).
2 
While this set of studies and the current one each embodies a type of endogenous quality 
determination, the nature and consequences of product quality differences, key decision-making 
units, international trade context, and pertinent policy analyses differ substantially.
3  
Second, consumer inability to distinguish safe and unsafe products in the marketplace 
resembles consumer inability to distinguish goods by production process (eco-friendly, 
sweatshop, etc.) which, if known, would affect willingness to pay.
4 Since welfare analyses of 
trade policy in the latter context lack explicit representation of how production process affects 
consumer utility, it is difficult to directly compare these studies with the present model. In 
addition, “labeling” in this literature is standard-conforming certification, a process that allows 
the consumer to definitively separate products of different “quality” in the marketplace. In 
contrast, in the current model, risk of purchasing and consuming an unsafe product cannot be 
                                                 
1 See, for instance, Oi (1973), Epple and Raviv (1978), Spence (1977), Shapiro (1983), Daughety and Reinganum 
(1995), and Boom (1998) for theoretical analyses on product safety, among many others. For the impact of food 
safety on meat demand and for a partial review of empirical studies on food safety, see Piggott and Marsh (2004). 
For extensive theoretical analysis in a domestic context, see Fulton and Giannakas (2004) and references therein. 
2 See Grossman and Horn (1988), Bagwell and Staiger (1989), Falvey (1989), Bagwell (1991), Raff and Kim 
(1999), and Chisik (2003) among many others. 
3  An interesting extension of the present research would link to these previous analyses by incorporating the 
possibility of consumer misperceptions of the safety of a specific country’s exports as a consequence of the 
publicized outbreak of a foodborne disease in that country. Depending upon the nature of the disease, and the 
feasibility of its plausible incorporation into the potential exporter’s explicit choice between “high quality” and “low 
quality” production, the situation could have similarities to examples that motivate the analyses of country-of-origin 
reputations.   
4 Haener and Luckert (1998) and Blend and Ravensway (1999) provide empirical evidence of consumer willingness 
to pay a “green premium.” Theoretical foundations of the literature date from the classic Akerlof (1970) study of the 
“hidden quality” problem associated with lemons in the used car market. Recent work by Gaisford and Lau (2000) 
and Beaulieu and Gaisford (2002) address welfare implications of indistinguishable standard-conforming and non-
conforming goods, including effects of certification labeling.     3
completely eliminated. If the only labeling possibility is country of origin, and if the consumer 
knows the proportion of imports that are standard-conforming versus non-standard conforming, 
then straightforward representation of how production process affects utility renders the situation 
a special case of this study’s more general model. 
A third strand of literature analyzes rules of origin (ROO) that prevent transshipment in a 
Free Trade Area (FTA). The effects of ROO on trade, welfare and distribution of rents in the 
supply chain under various market structures have been extensively examined in the literature.
5 
While both ROO and COOL involve “country labeling,” there are critical distinctions for policy 
analysis modeling. ROO impacts the consumer directly via price (higher or lower depending 
upon eligibility for tariff-free shipment). COOL, in contrast, directly influences consumer 
behavior by expanding information on product attributes he/she associates with expected product 
safety. Price consequences are only indirect, as the change in consumer information alters 
demand conditions. More basically, the unobservable product-quality differences inherent in a 
COOL analysis give rise to the possibility of different prices for domestic and foreign production 
that do not characterize homogeneous ROO markets. 
This paper develops a partial equilibrium model to analyze the welfare effects of a COOL 
program in the presence of risky foods supplied by domestic and/or foreign producers under 
perfect competition. The theoretical model uses building blocks from the seminal study by Oi 
(1973), who established that in the presence of insurance markets, the uncertainty associated 
with the risk of consuming an unsafe product is reflected in the risk-adjusted price (RAP)
6. 
Higher than the market price, the RAP includes the proportion of unsafe units in the parent 
product and expected damage costs of consuming those hazardous units. In this paper, we 
consider a product with an inherent health risk. The consumer knows with some exogenous 
probability (equal to the proportion of unsafe units) that the product is risky, but cannot 
determine whether the consumption of any particular unit will lead to adverse health outcomes. 
The primary focus of the research is the welfare effects of international trade in such a product 
and international trade policies with regard to such a product, when safety varies by country of 
origin.  
                                                 
5 Krueger (1993, 1997), Lloyd (1993), Lopez-de-Silanes, Markusen and Rutherford (1996), Rodriguez (2001), 
Falvey and Reed (2002). For a recent literature review see Krishna (2005). 
6 In this paper we use the terminology of risk-adjusted price instead of full price, because it is more self-explanatory. 
The full price concept was developed by Becker (1965) to analyze the ultimate consumption flow.   4
We first analyze the effects of product risk and severity of the disease (as measured by the 
per-unit opportunity cost plus monetary cost of illness) on social welfare for the autarky (closed-
economy) equilibrium. Because the presence of safety risk creates a difference between the 
consumer (RAP) and the producer (market) price, the market for a risky product might not exist 
(Proposition 1). As intuitively expected, an increase in the riskiness of the product, or in the cost 
of illness, leads to a decrease in social welfare (Proposition 2).  
For a small country that imports a riskier product than it produces, movement from the 
autarky equilibrium to free-trade in the absence of a COOL program (i.e., un-COOL trade) leads 
to a decrease in the production of safer domestic units and to a decrease in producer surplus. The 
effect of un-COOL free trade on expected consumer surplus is ambiguous and the welfare 
ranking between un-COOL trade and autarky is also ambiguous (Proposition 3). This result is 
consistent with the theory of distortions (Bhagwati 1971): Un-COOL trade involves an 
informational distortion associated with the inability of consumers to assign the correct risk level 
to domestic and foreign goods that leads to a pooling equilibrium and ambiguous gains from 
trade. This result allows for the possibility of welfare-enhancing import bans. Even in the case 
where an import ban does not dominate un-COOL free trade, some restriction of un-COOL trade 
is always welfare-enhancing.  
We then analyze the effects of introducing a COOL program that permits the consumer to 
differentiate safer domestically produced goods and less safe imports. Equilibrium requires 
equalization of the RAPs between the domestic and foreign goods resulting in an increase in the 
price and quantity of the healthier domestic product and an increase in the producer surplus 
(Proposition 4). Simultaneously, the implementation of COOL leads to a decrease in aggregate 
safe quantities of the product consumed and a decline in the expected consumer surplus. COOL 
removes the informational distortion associated with differential risk levels and reestablishes the 
traditional gains from trade (Proposition 5): In the presence of COOL, more trade (caused by a 
reduction in a tariff) increases the welfare of a small country even if it imports riskier goods. 
More COOL trade is better than less COOL trade and welfare under COOL trade exceeds that of 
autarky or un-COOL trade.  
While no model can thoroughly address the multiplicity of issues regarding food safety and 
global commerce, the current theoretical model sheds some light on the efficacy of trade policies 
commonly proposed to deal with those issues. It is a first step in developing a rational approach   5
to the economic cost-benefit analysis of COOL programs that several industrial countries, 
including the US, are considering implementing or have recently implemented. 
Section 2 of the paper develops the model and studies the properties of the closed-
economy equilibrium. Section 3 introduces the economics of un-COOL free-trade, and derives 
its welfare implications, for a small country importing a riskier product than it produces 
domestically. Section 4 analyzes the economic effects of COOL trade. Conclusions are provided 
in the last section and some proofs are relegated to appendixes.  
 
2.  Closed-Economy Equilibrium 
Consider an economy producing an unsafe (risky) good denoted by  X  and an outside 
composite safe good Y , which will be used as the numeraire. Assume that labor is the only 
factor of production, and that each unit of good Y  requires one unit of labor, implying that 
wages are equal to unity. To focus on the analysis of product safety we assume that perfect 
competition prevails in all markets and consumers have identical preferences.   
The risk associated with a purchase X of the unsafe good is captured by the assumption 
that it embodies a certain proportion, λ , of safe units, Z X λ = , and a remaining unsafe portion, 
(1 ) λ −  with 01 λ ≤≤ . Consumption of safe units yields positive utility, but consumption of 
unsafe units not only results in no addition to utility, but simultaneously incurs a cost L per unit 
of unsafe good consumed. While the consumer knows the risk of becoming ill, captured by 
parameterλ
7, he/she cannot differentiate between a safe and an unsafe unit. For instance, 
according to the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS 2004) of the USDA, a consumer faces 
a 
6 (1 ) 3.5 10 λ
− −=×  probability of becoming ill from Salmonella, if he/she eats one egg. This 
probability is obtained by dividing 174,356, the estimated number of annual illnesses attributed 
to Salmonella for 2000, by the U.S. population to obtain the per-capita chance of becoming ill 
and then dividing the resulting expression by 178, the annual per-capita consumption of eggs . 
An alternative interpretation of the risk embodied in  X  is as follows: Rather than an 
expected proportion, λ , of safe units in any purchase  X  and a resultant (1 ) λ −  expected 
                                                 
7 In our formulation the probability of the adverse health outcome is treated as “objective” information. Thus, any 
consumer who faces the same problem will assign the same probability. One could introduce the case where λ  
depends on self-protection actions and on a set of information (i.e. past experience) that each consumer uses in 
forming risk perceptions. This is an interesting generalization that is left for future research. Notice, though that any 
valuation of a public policy change should be based on objective risks.    6
proportion of unsafe units, the consumer making a purchase of  X  faces an exogenous 
probability (1 ) λ −  the purchase will make him/her ill. Concomitantly, with probability λ , the 
purchase can be expected to be consumed  without adverse health consequences. If a particular 
expenditure on  X  turns out to be a “bad lot,” then the associated cost of illness is proportional to 
the volume of  X  purchased and consumed. Both interpretations yield the same key relationships 
that are used in the subsequent model analysis, but formal presentation is restricted to the first 
interpretation.  
We postulate the existence of a competitive health (medical) insurance market that 
provides insurance to all consumers in the market against the loss L caused by the consumption 
of the unsafe product. Loss L is given exogenously and captures the direct (i.e., medical 
treatment) costs and the indirect (i.e., lost wages) costs of illness per-unit of unsafe  X  
consumed. Parameter L can be as large as the economic cost of life (as in the case of the “Mad 
Cow” disease) and in principle depends on the quality of the health system.  Following the 
insurance literature, we further assume that the insurance offered to the consumers is full and 
actuarially fair in the sense that the insurance premium equals the expected value of the 
insurance claims.
8 In the case of eggs, one can measure the expected damage cost to the 
consumer using the cost of illness (COI) data available on the ERS website Foodborne Illness 
Cost Calculator (FCOI 2004). The COI method includes both direct and indirect costs of an 
illness. In the case of Salmonella in eggs, the ERS website data imply that the average cost of 
illness is $2,126. 
Assuming the representative consumer derives utility only from the safe units Z  of 
product  X and from the outside (safe) good Y ; and, following the standard approach to partial-
equilibrium analysis, suppose that the utility function is separable in  X  and Y  
()( ) , UZ Y uZ Y =+                         ( 1 )  
where  () uZ is an increasing and concave function of the safe quantity of the risky good  X  and 
indicates that the consumer does not receive any utility from the unsafe units  X Z −
9. In this 
formulation, the price of product Y  is equal to unity (numeraire), while the market price of 
                                                 
8 The absence of an actuarially fair and full insurance complicates the analysis. See Oi (1973) and especially Epple 
and Raviv (1978) among others for more details on this issue. Oi (1973) adopts the assumption of full and 
actuarially fair insurance, while Epple and Raviv (1978) provide also results for the case of partial insurance. 
9 The analysis can be generalized to the case of severe risky products that result in a negative utility level if one 
risky unit is consumed. This novel extension is beyond the scope of the present paper.   7
product  X  is denoted by P . Since Y  enters the consumer’s utility linearly, equation (1) allows 
us to focus on partial-equilibrium analysis, while the assumption of a single unsafe product will 
be relaxed in section 4 that analyzes the economic effects of COOL. 
The above notation and assumptions imply the following maximization problem for the 
representative consumer. For a given amount of  X  purchased, only  X λ  will yield positive 
utility. Insuring against the expected cost of illness (or setting aside the funds to pay for it) 
requires expenditure of (1 )LX λ − . Assuming a total budget M , and a price P  of  X , the 
consumer’s maximization problem is as follows:  
() (1 )
X Max u X M PX LX λλ ⎡⎤ +− − − ⎣⎦                     (2) 






− ′ =+                         ( 3 )  
where a prime superscript denotes a partial derivate and the argument in the left-hand side of (3) 
is equal to the amount of “safe” food consumed (Z X λ = ). Concavity of  () . u  guarantees that the 
second-order condition for (2) is satisfied.  
Recalling that the consumer derives utility only from good Y  and the safe units Z  of 
product  X , it is obvious from (3) that the solution to the utility maximization problem (2) is 
identical to maximizing  ()( ) , UZ Y uZ Y =+  subject to the budget constraint  ˆ M PZ Y = + , 
where  





=+                         ( 4 )  
is the risk-adjusted price (RAP) of an unsafe good. In the presence of actuarially fair insurance, 
the economic interpretation of (4) is described elegantly by Oi (1973)
10:  ˆ P  is the risk-adjusted 
price (expected cost) of obtaining a safe unit of a risky product,  / P λ  is the warranty price, and 
the term (1 ) / L λ λ −  is the actuarially fair insurance premium rate per “safe” unit.  
We illustrate the relative magnitude of the RAP for the case of eggs embodying the risk of 
contracting Salmonella. Substituting the risk of becoming sick (
6 13 . 5 1 0 λ
− −= × ), the cost of 
illness ( $2,126 L = ), the market price of one grade A shell egg ( $0.081 P = ), the RAP of eggs 
                                                 
10 See also Becker (1965) who developed the technique of decomposing the full price of an ultimate consumption 
flow. Notice that the full price concept in these studies is termed as risk-adjusted price in our paper.   8
becomes 
6 0.081 ˆ 2,126*3.5 10 $0.088
0.999997
P
− =+× = . In other words, the consumer behaves as if 
the risk of Salmonella generates an 8.6% increase in the market price for safe eggs with a 
corresponding decrease in the quantity of eggs consumed. 
Equation (3) defines the demand function for the safe quantity of a risky product  X  as a 
function of its RAP  ˆ P , and is denoted by  ( ) ˆ D Z P . This relationship will be used in calculating 
the expected consumer surplus in the welfare analysis. Recalling the relationship between the 
safe and unsafe quantities of a risky product, Z X λ = , the demand for the risky product  X can 
be obtained then by  () () ˆˆ DD XPZP λ = . Substituting  X Z λ =  into the left-hand side of (3) 
yields the inverse market demand function of the risky good  X , where the dependent variable is 
the market price (as opposed to the RAP): 
() (1 ) PuX L λ λλ ′ =− −                        ( 5 )  
Equation (5) yields the first result of our model which is stated in the following 
proposition: 
Proposition 1: A market for an unsafe product does not exist if the following condition holds: 
() 0( 1) 0 Pu L λλ ′ =− − ≤ , i.e., the vertical intercept of its market demand curve is non-positive.  
The condition in proposition 1 defines a lower bound of product safety  ( ) 0 /( 0 ) 1 LLu λ ′ =+ <  
which varies positively with L and negatively with the marginal utility of consuming the first 
safe unit of the good.  
The supply side of the economy is modeled as follows: We assume that producers 
maximize profits with respect to a given market price P  of the risky product  X  and that the 
output of good  X supplied is given by  
()
S X P                          ( 6 )  
where  () /0
S XP P ∂∂ > , and  ()0
S XP =  for a non-negative price  0 P ≥ : The supply curve is 
upward sloping and has a non-negative vertical intercept. The assumption of a non-negative 
vertical intercept is not critical for the analysis. Implicit in (6) is the assumption that the supply 
of a risky good does not depend on the proportion of “safe” units, but simply on per unit market   9
price of  X .
11 For welfare analysis purposes, it is useful to invert (6) and define the inverse 
supply of a risky good  X  
() ( ) / PP X P Z λ ==                         ( 7 )  
where ( )/ 0 PX X ∂∂ >  and  () 00 PP => . The supply of safe units  ( ) ,
S Z P λ  is straightforwardly 
obtained by multiplying (6) by the proportion of safe units λ , i.e.,  ( )( ) ,
SS Z PX P λλ = .  
The autarky (closed-economy) equilibrium condition requires equality between the 
quantity supplied and the quantity demanded for the tradeable good X :   
() ( ) ,,
SD X PXPL λ =                       ( 8 )  
Condition (8) determines the market equilibrium price  A P  (where subscript  A denotes the 
autarky equilibrium) and the equilibrium quantity of  X ,  A X . In addition, multiplying both sides 
of equation (8) by λ , evaluated at  A P , yields    
( )() () ( ) ˆ ,, ,, ,
SD D
AA A Z P X PL Z P PL λλ λ λ =≡   .               (9) 
which implies equality between the equilibrium level of safe units of good  X  produced and 
consumed. Having determined the producer price  A P , one can calculate the consumer RAP,  A P ˆ ,  
directly by setting  A PP =  in (4).   
Figure 1 illustrates the closed-economy equilibrium. The horizontal axis measures the 
amount of safe and total units, Z  and  X  respectively, and the vertical axis denotes prices (both 
market and risk adjusted). The upward-slopped curve  ( )
S X P  illustrates the supply (and inverse 
supply) curve of the risky good, and the downward-slopped curve  ( ) ,,
D X PL λ  is the market 
demand curve for the risky good  X , which is implicitly defined by equation (5).
12 The 
intersection of these two curves illustrates geometrically the solution of (8), which yields the 
closed-economy market-equilibrium price  A P  and quantity produced  A X . Having determined the 
equilibrium quantity of the risky good produced  A X , one can readily determine the equilibrium 
                                                 
11 One could introduce the assumption that the supply of a risky good is a decreasing function of λ  and analyze the 
effects of policies that provide direct incentives to producers to increase the safety of their products. This 
generalization is beyond the scope of the present paper and constitutes an interesting topic for further research. 
12 These curves are not straight lines in general, but the use of linear curves in all figures of the paper is based on 
expositional considerations.    10
amount of safe units  AA Z X λ =  by subtracting horizontally the amount of unsafe units (1 ) A X λ −  
from  A X  (i.e., the intersection of  A P  and  ( ) ,





















Figure 1: Closed-Economy Equilibrium 
The downward-slopped curve  () ˆ D Z P  illustrates the demand curve for safe units Z  as a function 
of the risk-adjusted price  ˆ P  (defined in equation (3)). Evaluating this inverse demand curve at 
the equilibrium level of safe units  A Z  yields the equilibrium RAP,  A P ˆ , which exceeds the market 
price. Area (α) that is located below curve  ( ) ˆ D Z P  and above the equilibrium RAP,  A P ˆ , is equal 
to the expected consumer surplus.  
Area (β+γ), which is located below the market equilibrium price  A P  and above the supply 
curve  ()
S X P , measures producer surplus. In our analysis producer surplus captures the rents to 
specific factors (or industry profits) associated with the supply of  A X  risky units, given our 
assumption that consumers bear all the risks and so producers are not concerned with the 
distinction between safe and unsafe units. Consequently, the closed-economy equilibrium level 
of social welfare is measured by area (α+β+γ). This geometric property will be utilized later in 
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standard measure of producer surplus implies that producers are not liable for the production of 
unsafe units and our analysis abstracts from moral hazard and principal-agent considerations 
associated with the production of unsafe products. These issues have been analyzed in closed 
economy models and constitute an important direction for future research.
13 
It is apparent from Fig. 1 that, in the presence of foodborne risk, the closed-economy 
equilibrium involves two distinct types of welfare distortions. First, consumer behavior depends 
on the RAP, which exceeds the market price. This discrepancy between the two prices is similar 
to the welfare effects of a specific tax incidence that reduces total welfare. Second, unlike a tax 
incidence, in the present model the “tax revenue” is proportional to the value of the unsafe units 
which does not yield any utility to the consumer. In other words, the corresponding “tax 
revenue” is not a transfer but a pure welfare loss associated with the production and consumption 
of unsafe units. This welfare loss is measured by the area  A A A Z P P ) ˆ ( −  in Fig. 1 and depends on 
the market quantity of Z, the proportion of unsafe units, and the per-unit cost of illness. 
In addition, for any given parameters of the model and in the presence of perfect 
competition, the market solution maximizes social welfare (defined as the sum of expected 
consumer plus producer surplus). In other words, unless the social planner can alter the risk 
parameter  λ  (perhaps though testing) or the per-unit cost of illness L (through health care 
reforms or development of better treatments), the market solution coincides with the 
maximization of social welfare. To establish this property, denote with  () CX the aggregate 
social (and private) costs of producing  X  units of the risky good. Assuming a total budget of 
M , the social planner derives utility from the amount of safe units consumed Z X λ =  and 
incurs two types of costs, health insurance costs (1 )LX λ −  and production costs  () CX. Hence, 
the social planner’s problem is  
() ( 1) ( )
X Max u X M LX C X λ λ ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ +− − −   
which yields the first-order condition 





′ − ′ =+                    ( 1 0 )    
                                                 
13 Spence (1977), Epple and Raviv (1978), and Boom (1998) among others have developed closed-economy models 
that explicitly analyze producer liability issues.    12
In the competitive market equilibrium,  ) (X C P ′ = . Comparing (10) with (3) yields the desired 
result, namely that, under consumer liability and full insurance, the market equilibrium 
maximizes the level of national welfare. 
Differentiating the equilibrium conditions (8) and/or (9) totally, one can derive the 
comparative statics properties of the closed-economy equilibrium.  
Proposition 2: The closed-economy equilibrium is characterized by the following properties: 
(a) An increase in per-unit damage cost L ↑ shifts the market demand curve in Fig. 1, 
(,,)
D X LP λ , downward and generates: a decline in the market-equilibrium price  A P ; a fall in 
the equilibrium quantities  A X  and  A Z ; an increase in the risk-adjusted price A P ˆ ; and a 
reduction the social welfare, measured by expected consumer plus producer surplus. 
(b) A decline in product safety, measured by a reduction in parameter λ ↓, reduces social 
welfare. 
(c) If the market price elasticity for product  X  is not numerically small, i.e., 
() ( ) ( )
DD
P X PP X PPL ε −= − ∂ ∂ > +, then a decline in product safety, measured by a 
reduction in parameter λ ↓, shifts downward the market demand curve in Fig. 1,  (,,)
D X LP λ , 
and shifts inward the supply of safe units,  ( ) ,
S Z P λ , generating declines in the market-
equilibrium price  A P , the market-equilibrium quantity  A X  and the amount of safe quantity  A Z  
and a rise in the equilibrium risk-adjusted price A P ˆ .  
Part (a) follows straightforwardly from (5) and Figure 1. For part (b), differentiate welfare (W = 
) ( ) 1 ( ) ( X C LX M X u − − − + λ λ ) with respect to λ  and simplify using (10) to verify 
0 dW dλ > . For (c), substitute  X λ  for Z  in (10) and then differentiate totally to determine 
dX dλ  whose sign depends upon the sign of  L u X u + ′ + ′ ′ (.) (.)λ . Use (5) differentiated with 
respect to  X  (λ  fixed) to establish (c). For the rest of the analysis we assume 2.c holds. 
These results are consistent with the empirical evidence that consumer demand is 
susceptible to any new information concerning the way consumers perceive objective (or 
subjective) threats to food safety as measured by the parameters λ  and L. For instance, 
according to Piggott and Marsh (2004) the public will generally respond to a foodborne outbreak 
by decreasing its consumption, at least in the short run. Moreover, if the food-safety problem is   13
recurring, it can result in an inward shift of consumer demand for a specific good. In the case of 
the 1996 outbreak of BSE (“Mad Cow” disease) in the United Kingdom, both the product risk 
(1-λ ) and loss L (equal to the statistical value of life) were large and caused a substantial 
decline in the demand for beef. However, if the product risk (1-λ ) is very small, then even for 
large L the difference between the RAP and the market price will be small and the demand for a 
risky product will be determined by its market price. This is consistent with the findings of a 
report by the Foreign Agricultural Service of the USDA (FAS 1998), which indicated that while 
E.U. consumers are concerned with food safety, price of beef is also important in deciding 
whether or not to purchase beef. That is, if the price of beef is low enough, consumers may buy it 
despite any remaining concerns over BSE.  
 
3.  Un-COOL Free Trade 
Having established the welfare properties and comparative statics of the closed economy 
equilibrium, we now analyze the benchmark free-trade equilibrium in the absence of country-of- 
origin labeling (COOL). We assume that the consumer cannot distinguish imports and domestic 
goods in the marketplace although he/she knows all the parameters of the model and the market 
equilibrium values of the relevant endogenous variables. Consequently, this section analyzes the 
pooling equilibrium associated with an informational distortion: The inability of the domestic 
consumer to differentiate between imports and domestic products. To facilitate the economic 
intuition and the clarity of the geometric analysis, we will illustrate the free-trade equilibrium for 
the case of a country that imports an unsafe good at a fixed international market price  * P  (the 
small-country case). This implies that the home country faces a horizontal supply curve of 
imports at the international market price  * P  and each unit of imports carries a risk of becoming 
ill equal to 1* λ − .
14  
Denote with  T X  the market quantity of the domestic risky product and with  * T X  the 
corresponding quantity of risky imports coming from the rest of the world, where subscript T  
will be used to indicate function and variables associated with the (free) trade equilibrium. Let 
TT Z X λ =  be the domestic “safe” quantity consumed that does not result in any adverse health 
outcomes. Similarly, assume that  * * * TT Z X λ =  is the corresponding quantity of the foreign 
                                                 
14 Here we abstract from analyzing the case in which a country’s imports originate from a variety of countries with 
different safety parameters  * λ . This case can be analyzed, but it is beyond the scope of the present paper.   14
(imported) safe food so the aggregate consumption of safe units is given by  * TT Z Z + . Assume 
for simplicity that parameters  , * [0,1] λ λ ∈  are exogenous and may differ from each other. 
Without loss of generality, assume  ( ) 00 max *, * 1 λλ λ λ < << , which implies markets exist for 
each of the two products and home produces a safer product than the rest of the world. Assume 
finally that damage costs L associated with consumption of unsafe domestic and imported goods 
are equal—i.e., the illness imports carry is the same as that of domestic production. 
Since consumers cannot distinguish between the two risky goods, free-trade will result in 
equalization of the domestic and world prices, i.e.,  * PP = . The market quantity supplied will be 
* TT X X + , where the domestic quantity supplied  T X  is given by  () *
S X P  —the domestic 
supply curve evaluated at the world market price. The domestic supply of safe units is 
consequently given by  TT Z X λ = . To determine the market-equilibrium quantity of imports 
* T X  note that imported and domestic goods are indistinguishable in the marketplace and their 
costs of illness per unsafe unit consumed are identical. This implies consumer demand will 
depend on the average probability of becoming ill  ( *)/( *) TT T T T ZZ XX λ = ++ . In this case, the 
solution to the consumer problem can be obtained by assuming that he/she maximizes utility 
() * TT uZ Z +  by choosing the aggregate quantity consumed  * TT Z Z +  subject to the non-
stochastic budget constraint  ˆ (* ) TT T M YP Z Z =+ + . The first-order condition of the consumer’s 
maximization problem is then given by 
() ˆ *[ * ( 1 ) ] / TT T T T uZ Z P P L λ λ ′ += = + −                  ( 1 1 )  
where  * P  is the common market price,  ˆ
T P  is the free-trade risk-adjusted price,  
**














               (12) 
is the free-trade consumption safety level, and  * */( *) TT T sX XX = +  is the consumption share of 
imports. Un-COOL free-trade yields a common market price  * P  and a common RAP given by 
(11). Substituting (12) and  ( ) *
S
T Z XP λ =  into (11) determines the un-COOL free-trade 
equilibrium value of safe imports  * T Z , which can readily be transformed into the market-
equilibrium quantity of imports  * */ * TT XZ λ = .   15
Fig. 2 illustrates the determination of the un-COOL free-trade equilibrium values of safe 
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.                     ( 1 4 )  
Because the domestic quantity of safe units  ( ) ( ) **
S
T Z PX P λ =  is a function only of the world 
price and λ, (13) and (14) constitute a system of two simultaneous equations in two unknowns 
T λ  and  * T Z . The solution is illustrated in Fig. 2. The upward-slopped curve is the graph of 
equation (13). It has a positive vertical intercept defined by setting  * 0 T Z =  in equation (13), and 
a positive slope: 
 
Figure 2. Determination of Free-Trade Equilibrium of 
Imports and Food Safety 
As the quantity of safe imports increases the marginal utility declines, and the denominator of 
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* Z  
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T λ  
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λ    16
the assumption that domestically produced goods are safer than imported ones ( *1 λ λ << ). The 
vertical intercept of the downward-slopped curve equals λ : For any level of safe domestic units 
() * T Z P , as the amount of imports increases, the level of product safety declines. The 
intersection of these two curves determines the free-trade equilibrium quantity of safe imports 
* T Z  and the level of  T λ . The total quantity of imports is given by  * */ * TT XZ λ = . 
Note that if  * A PP ≥ , the graph of equation (13) in Fig. 2 lies above that of equation (14) 
for non-zero  * T Z  and the free-trade equilibrium reduces to the autarky equilibrium. If 
() *0
S XP= , (14) in Fig. 2 is undefined at Z*=0 and otherwise horizontal at  T λ = * λ . The free-
trade equilibrium reduces to one of solely purchasing imports. We abstract from these 
uninteresting degenerative equilibria by assuming: 
* A PP <  and  () *0
S XP>                    ( 1 5 )  
Fig. 3 illustrates the welfare effects of unsafe food imports and the autarky welfare level. It 
does this by superimposing on the closed-economy equilibrium in Fig. 1, the market supply of 
imports, which is a horizontal line intersecting the vertical axis at  * P .  
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P  
0  T X    17
The closed-economy equilibrium corresponds to the market price  A P , and the RAP A P ˆ  
where  . ) ˆ ( A A
D X P Z λ =  Price  A P  determines the producer surplus (β+γ) and RAP A P ˆ  determines 
expected consumer surplus (α). The opening of trade establishes a lower producer price  * P  and 
results in the importation of  * * * TT Z X λ =  units of safe imports and (1 *) * T X λ −  units of unsafe 
imports. Under un-COOL free trade, domestic producers face a lower price and reduce the 
quantity of unsafe and safe food produced, and therefore the producer surplus is equal to area (β). 
The move from autarky to free trade results in a decline in the producer surplus which equals 
area (γ) in Fig. 3.  
The effects of un-COOL free trade on the expected consumer surplus (and the total 
welfare) are in general ambiguous. In order to calculate the RAP associated with the free-trade 
equilibrium, one has to add the safe quantity embodied in imports  * T Z , which is determined in 
Fig. 2, to the domestic quantity of safe units  T Z . The RAP under free trade  ˆ
T P  corresponds to 
the total safe quantity consumed  * TT Z Z + . The area (α+δ), which is below curve  ( ) ˆ D Z P  and 
above the RAP  ˆ
T P  corresponds to the expected consumer surplus under un-COOL free trade. In 
general, the consumer welfare ranking between autarky and free-trade is ambiguous and depends 
on the ranking of the RAPs under the two regimes. The ranking is unclear because the move 
from autarky to free trade lowers price, but increases risk of illness. 
Fig. 3 illustrates a case in which the move from autarky to un-COOL free trade leaves the 
economy’s welfare unchanged: Un-COOL free-trade reduces the market price from  A P  to  * P  
and reduces the producer surplus by area (γ). This reduction in welfare is the same as the 
increase in expected consumer surplus measured by area (δ), caused by a reduction in the RAP 
from  A P ˆ  to  ˆ
T P . Thus, even if imports are more risky than domestic products, the economy is 
indifferent between imposing an import ban and engaging in free trade. Of course, in this case 
consumers like free trade more than the import ban (free trade results in higher consumer surplus 
than autarky), while producers would advocate an import ban based on the effects of trade on 
producer surplus. It is straightforward to show the existence of cases for welfare improving 
import bans. For example, starting at an equilibrium of indifference between a ban and free trade, 
a decline in import safety  * λ  does not affect the graph of equation (13) in Fig. 2, but rotates 
clockwise from its intercept the graph of equation (14)  and results in a lesser safe quantity of   18
imports * T Z , for any given market price  * P . This implies that the total safe quantity available 
to consumers  * TT Z Z +  declines in Fig. 3, and the expected consumer surplus under free un-
COOL trade falls. Since the expected producer surplus depends on the market price  * P , a 
reduction in  * λ  leaves this component of national welfare unaffected. Consequently, the 
expected gain from trade measured by area (δ-γ) is negative and an import ban improves welfare. 
One can readily construct other scenarios that justify the ban of unsafe imports based on other 
parameter changes.  
Note finally that even if free trade is preferred to a ban, there always exists a restriction of 
trade that improves welfare—i.e., free un-COOL trade is never welfare maximizing for a small 
country. (Proof is given in the Appendix A). The effects of moving from autarky to free-trade are 
summarized in the following proposition: 
Proposition 3: Starting at the autarky equilibrium and assuming that the domestically produced 
good is safer than the imported product ( * λ λ > ), the introduction of free-trade by a small 
country results in: 
(a) A decline in the market price and market quantity of the safer domestic product. 
(b) An increase in the market quantity and safe quantity of the less safe imported product. 
(c) An ambiguous effect on the total safe quantity consumed and on the expected consumer 
surplus. 
(d) A decrease in the safe quantity of the domestic good and a decrease in the producer surplus. 
(e) An ambiguous effect on national welfare measured by producer plus expected consumer 
surplus, but if welfare improves as a result of free trade, it can always be raised further by some 
restriction of free un-COOL trade. 
The reason for the ambiguous welfare ranking between the autarky and pooling equilibria 
can be traced to the theory of market distortions: While free trade introduces standard efficiency 
gains, it simultaneously introduces an informational distortion forcing consumers to act on a 
common (average) safety risk. The model is consistent with the evidence of import bans 
following outbreaks of foodborne disease abroad. These bans can be modeled as a move from 
un-COOL free trade (with safe domestic and risky imported goods,  1, * 1 λ λ = < ) to the autarky 
equilibrium. The welfare consequences of this move are in general ambiguous, and depend on 
the magnitudes of demand and supply elasticities, the severity in the reduction of food safety   19
captured by the risk parameter  * λ  and the damage costs L. For example, the larger the 
differential of safety risk between domestic and imported goods measured by  * λ λ − , the more 
likely it is that a trade ban will be welfare improving.  
The reason for the existence of a welfare enhancing trade restriction (even if free trade 
dominates an import ban) also derives from the informational distortion introduced by the 
imports. In particular, from the individual consumer perspective, the marginal unit of  X  carries 
a risk (1 ) (1 *) T λ λ −< −. However, for society, the marginal unit of  X  is imported and carries 
the higher illness risk (1 *) λ − . Alternatively, the RAP associated with a marginal unit of Z  for 
the consumer is less than the RAP associated with a marginal unit of Z  for society. 
Consequently, consumers over-consume Z  in the free-trade equilibrium, setting up the 
conditions for welfare-enhancing trade restrictions. 
 
4.  COOL Trade  
We are now in a position to analyze the economic effects of introducing country-of -origin 
labeling (COOL). In order to keep the analysis as simple as possible, we will not formally 
analyze the effects of costs associated with implementation of a COOL program. If the costs of 
instituting and maintaining a national COOL system are fixed or sunk costs, they constitute an 
additional welfare cost that can readily be incorporated in the cost-benefit calculations without 
altering the qualitative conclusions of the analysis. We will also treat COOL as a government 
policy introduced after the country has engaged in free trade and will maintain the small-country 
assumption for comparison purposes. The introduction of COOL removes the informational 
distortion associated with the inability of consumers to incorporate the safety risk differential 
between imports and domestic goods. In the presence of COOL trade, the consumer can 
distinguish whether a good is imported or domestic, allowing the two types of  X  to have 
different prices. Denoting COOL values by subscript C , maximizing the consumer’s utility 
function  () * CC uZ Z Y ++  subject to a deterministic budget constraint  ˆˆ ** CC C M PZ P Z Y =+ +  
yields the following first-order conditions for an interior solution :  
()




uZ Z P L
λ
λλ
− ′ += = +                   ( 1 6 )  
()




uZ Z P L
λ
λλ
− ′ += = +                   ( 1 7 )    20
where  C P  denotes the producer price of domestically produced  X , * P  the producer price of 
imports and “^” indicates associated RAP. Under COOL trade, the consumer buys the product 
with the lower risk-adjusted price, since a safe unit gives the consumer the same utility, whether 
it is produced domestically or imported. The different country-specific health risks generate 
perceived quality differences that are reflected in different market prices. Coexistence of both 
goods in the market requires that consumers derive the same marginal utility from the two risky 
products (that is, the consumer must be indifferent between consuming a safe unit of the 
domestic good and a safe unit of the imported good). This implies that the introduction of COOL 
results in equalization of RAP between the domestic and imported product. Formally, equations 
(16) and (17) imply that 
ˆ [( 1 ) ] /[ * ( 1 * ) ] / * CC PP L P L λ λλ λ =+ − = + −                  ( 1 8 )  
which determines  C P  and equilibrium RAPs,  ˆˆ * C PP = .  
Unlike the equilibrium analyzed in the previous section, COOL trade introduces a market 
price differential in favor of the safer product. Solving equation (18) for the producer price of the 









⎡⎤ − ⎛⎞ =+ ⎜⎟ ⎢⎥ ⎝⎠ ⎣⎦
                   ( 1 9 )  
According to equation (19), the good with the lower safety risk (in this case the domestic product 
since  * λ λ >  by assumption) commands a higher market price at equilibrium because the 
consumer perceives it as a higher quality (healthier) good. Substituting (19) into the domestic 
supply of the risky good yields the equilibrium safe domestic quantity produced 
() ( ) ,
SS
CC C Z ZP X P λλ ==                    ( 2 0 )  
Since the introduction of COOL raises the market price of the domestic product relative to the 
domestic price of imports ( * C PP > ), the introduction of COOL generates a higher producer 
surplus compared to the free-trade equilibrium without COOL. Therefore, abstracting from 
implementation costs, the introduction of COOL will be supported by producers of domestic 
goods that are safer than imported ones.  
COOL effects on expected consumer surplus depend on COOL effects on the RAP. From 
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⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
′ +
               (21) 
The total amount of safe quantity consumed under COOL free trade is strictly less than the 
corresponding quantity under un-COOL free trade, i.e.  * * CC TT Z ZZ Z + <+ . This inequality 
follows from the concavity of the consumer’s utility function. The result implies that, starting at 
the un-COOL free-trade equilibrium, the introduction of COOL reduces the expected consumer 
surplus, which is an increasing function of the aggregate safe quantity consumed. Since the 
consumption of the safer domestic good increases with the introduction of COOL, (i.e., 
CT Z Z > ), the safe (and market) quantity of imports declines (i.e.,  * * CT Z Z < ). Thus, COOL 
increases the domestic market price of the safer (domestic) product, reduces the quantity of the 
less safe (imported) product by more than the increase in domestic production, and results in a 
reduction of expected consumer surplus. These results lead to the following proposition that 
summarizes the economic effects of introducing a COOL program. 
Proposition 4: Starting at the un-COOL free-trade equilibrium and assuming that the 
domestically produced good is safer than the imported product ( * λ λ > ), the introduction of 
COOL by a small country results in: 
(a) An increase in the market price and market quantity of the safer domestic product. 
(b) A decline in the market quantity and safe quantity of the less safe imported product. 
(c) A decline in the total safe quantity consumed and a decline in the expected consumer surplus. 
(d) An increase in the safe quantity of the domestic good and an increase in the producer 
surplus. 
We are now in a position to establish the optimality of COOL. With a price  * P  for 
imports,  * X , and P  for domestically produced  X ,  d X , and a domestic cost of producing  d X , 
() d CX , the level of national welfare in general is given by: 
() ( ) ** [ ( 1 ) ( 1 * ) * ] ** dd d WuX X M L X L X C X P X λλ λ λ =++ − − + − −−        (22) 
An interior maximum for W  (0 , * 0 d XX >> ), requires: 
() ( ) **( 1 ) 0 dd uX X L C X λλ λ λ ′′ +− − −=    and               (23)   22
() ** * ( 1 * ) * 0 d uX X L P λλλ λ ′ +− − − =                  ( 2 4 )  
The concavity of u and  0 > ′ ′ C assure second order conditions are satisfied. Given that bothC′ 
and u′are monotonic, if an interior maximum exists, it is unique. Since  C C P X C = ′ ) (,  ( 1 6 )  a n d  
(17) imply an interior COOL equilibrium is this unique maximum. Note that un-COOL trade can 
never maximize welfare since joint satisfaction of (23) and (24) at ( 0, * 0 d XX >> ) requires 
() * d CX P ′ >  (assuming  * λ λ > ) and in the un-COOL trade equilibrium  * ) ( P X C T = ′ . 
Appendix B establishes that if an interior maximum exists, it dominates corner solutions of 
0 d X =  and  *0 X = . Hence, if an interior COOL equilibrium exists, it dominates both autarky 
and the un-COOL trade equilibrium. A corner COOL equilibrium at all imports is precluded by 
(15).
15 A corner COOL equilibrium at the autarky solution can be consistent with (15). In that 
case,  
*















i.e., at the autarky solution, the marginal utility of an additional unit of Z  is less than the RAP of 
buying it as an import and hence, there is no market for imports. In this situation, clearly the 
equivalent autarky and corner COOL equilbria dominate the un-COOL trade equibrium because 
no interior maximum exists. Hence, welfare under a COOL regime always exceeds that of un-
COOL trade and it exceeds that of autarky except in cases the two are equivalent.  
Furthermore, it is straightforward to establish that any restriction of COOL trade reduces 
welfare
16. If a non-prohibitive specific tariff, t, is imposed on imports, the COOL equilibrium 
can be determined as above by replacing  * P  by  * Pt + . Equations (17), (19) and (20) with  * P  
replaced by  * Pt +  determine the market-equilibrium values of  C P ,  C Z , and  * C Z . Substituting 
CC Z X λ =  and  * * * CC Z X λ =  in (17) and differentiating totally the system of these equations 
yields  
                                                 
15 A corner COOL equilibrium at all imports can exist only if 
*( 1 * ) ( 0 ) ( 1 )
*
PL C L λ λ
λλ
′ +− +−
<  which is precluded 
by (15) and  (.) 0 C′′ >  which imply  (0) * CP ′ < , and  * λ λ > . 
16 For this derivation we assume an interior COOL solution since imposing tariffs in the corner COOL solution of 
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.                 (26) 
Because the safe quantities of domestic and imported products are proportional to  C X  and  * C X , 
an increase in protection increases  C Z  and reduces  * C Z . As a result, protection has the standard 
effects of increasing the domestic production and reducing the level of imports. 
For any given budget M , the social planner derives utility from the safe units consumed 
() ** CC uX X λλ +  and faces insurance costs (1 ) (1 *) * CC LX LX λ λ − +−  to cover the costs of 
illness from domestic and imported risky products. In addition, the social planner faces domestic 
production costs  () C CX  and import costs ( * ) * C Pt X + . Since the government collects the tariff 
revenue * C tX ⋅ , which is distributed back to consumers, under the standard assumption, the net 
social costs of imports are simply  * * C PX . The level of national welfare as a function of the 
specific tariff is 
() () () ( )( )
() () ()




Wt u X t X t M L X t L X t
CX t PX t
λλ λ λ ⎡ ⎤ =+ + − −+ − ⎣ ⎦
−−
 
Differentiating the above expression with respect to the specific tariff yields: 
() {} []
*
(1 ) . * (1 *) *
CC dX dX dW
uL C u L P
dt dt dt
λλ λ λ ′′ ′ =− − − + − − −           (27) 
Equation (16) and the property  ( ) CC PC X ′ =  imply that, under COOL, the term in the curly 
bracket of (27) is zero. From (17), the expression in the square bracket is equal to the value of 
the specific tariff. Therefore, taking into account the above analysis and using (26) one can 











=<                   ( 2 8 )  
                                                 
17 See Feenstra (2004, Chapter 7) for a derivation of an identical expression in the case of a small country imposing 









==                   ( 2 9 )  
Inequality (28) states that national welfare is a decreasing function of the specific tariff for 
strictly positive values of t and equation (29) implies that welfare is maximized under COOL 
free trade. In words, there is no need for COOL trade import bans! We have established formally 
two key welfare results which are summarized in the following proposition.
18   
Proposition 5: In the presence of country-of-origin labeling (COOL), even if the domestically 
produced good is safer than the imported product ( * λ λ > ), a reduction in protection increases 
a small country’s level of national welfare: More COOL trade is better than less COOL trade, 
and COOL free trade is the best policy for a small country. 
Proposition 5 is consistent with the theory of trade distortions applied to this particular 
informational welfare distortion. The introduction of a COOL policy removes this distortion and 
reestablishes the traditional optimality of trade which asserts that more trade is better than less 
trade for a country that cannot change the terms-of-trade. This proposition also implies that if the 
costs of maintaining a COOL policy are unaffected by changes in the level of protection, more 
COOL trade is better even if a small country imports riskier goods. COOL seems to be the best 
policy instrument to offer protection from unsafe imports, assuming of course that the consumer 
is as informed as the policy makers about the potential risk of imports. 
 
4.  Concluding Remarks 
The present study developed a small open-economy partial-equilibrium model in which the 
small country produces an unsafe product and imports another riskier product under conditions 
of perfect competition. Product risk was modeled as the exogenous proportion of units of the 
parent good that lead to adverse health outcomes. Consumers were assumed to know this 
proportion, but they could not distinguish whether a particular unit of the good was safe or 
unsafe. The model was used to analyze three cases. The first was the closed-economy 
equilibrium, the second a free-trade regime without country-of-origin labeling (COOL), and the 
third was a free-trade regime coupled with a COOL program. 
                                                 
18 If the COOL equilibrium with no tariff is a corner solution, the argument doesn’t technically hold. However, if it 
is a corner at the autarky solution, the issue of tariffs is superfluous. If it is a corner with imports only, then a tariff 
which does not change the nature of that equilibrium leaves welfare unchanged—the consumer pays more for 
imports, but is returned the tariff revenues.    25
We established that the competitive equilibrium maximized social welfare for the closed 
economy situation where social welfare is measured by the sum of expected consumer and 
producer surplus. The presence of insurable risk creates a wedge between the producer and 
consumer price that depends positively on the per-unit cost of becoming ill and on the proportion 
of unsafe units embodied in the risky product. In the absence of a COOL program, the opening 
of trade with another country that produces a riskier good at a lower price results in a reduction 
in expected producer surplus and an ambiguous effect on expected consumer surplus. An 
ambiguous welfare outcome leaves open the possibility of welfare-improving trade bans. Even if 
free un-COOL trade dominates an import ban, welfare can always be increased by some 
restriction of un-COOL trade. The outcomes are consistent with the generalized theory of 
distortions: Un-COOL trade introduces an informational distortion to the open economy because 
the consumer cannot distinguish and incorporate into his/her behavior the differential risk 
between imports and domestic goods. 
The introduction of COOL addresses the source of the distortion directly, maximizes 
welfare and reestablishes the traditional insight that more (COOL) trade is better than less 
(COOL) trade for a small country even if imports are riskier. As a policy, COOL dominates trade 
bans and un-COOL trade. We suspect that this property would hold in a general equilibrium 
framework and in the case of a large country. 
Of course the model’s properties and results depend on several assumptions. We have 
assumed that the consumers are fully informed about the safety risk of the two products. 
However, consumers could form a subjective estimate of the risk of the product, which may be 
higher or lower than the objective risk assumed in this paper. We have also abstracted from 
analyzing the more realistic case of multiple import suppliers and multiple levels of country-
specific risky products. We have also avoided incorporating the effects of costs associated with 
implementation and maintenance of national COOL programs and the introduction of costly 
testing and disposal of unsafe units. Further, we have assumed that a competitive insurance 
market exists that offers an actuarially fair insurance premium to the consumers in order to cover 
the damages from consumption of unsafe goods. Finally we have analyzed the case of full 
consumer liability and abstracted from principal-agent and moral hazard issues associated with 
producer incentives. All these important topics represent very fruitful avenues for future research   26
some of which constitute work in progress by the authors. We complete the paper by addressing 
the title question for the demanding reader: 
How cool is COOL trade? Pretty cool indeed!   27
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Appendix A 
At any unrestricted un-COOL trade equilibrium, there always exists a trade restriction 
that improves welfare. 
 
A1. Tariff 
Welfare as a function of the specific tariff t,  ( ) Wt, is given for the un-COOL case by  
() () () ( )( )
() () ()




Wt u X t X t M L X t L X t
CX t PX t
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*] *) 1 ( * [ (.)} ) 1 ( { − − − ′ + ′ − − − ′ = λ λ λ λ           (A1) 
With un-COOL trade and a specific tariff,t, on imports (13) is modified by replacing  * P  by 
* Pt +  and (14) is unchanged except for recognition that  T Z  is a function of ( * Pt + ). For given 
* T Z , the shifts in equations (13) and (14) in Figure 2 as a function of t are readily determined 
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The sign of 
* T dZ
dt













                  ( A 3 )  
it is straightforward to show (A2), (A3) and  * λ λ > , imply the elasticity of  T X  with respect to t 







>                   ( A 4 )  
From (11),  * T λ λλ << , and  * ) ( P X C T = ′  at  0 t = , it follows at an un-COOL equilibrium with 
0 t = , the term in curly brackets in (A1) is strictly positive while the term in square brackets is 
strictly negative. Since  ( ) * T CX P t ′ =+  and  0 (.) > ′ ′ C ,  0 >
dt




dX T , then it follows   31











> , then use 
(A4) to derive at  0 t = , 
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dXT , the sign of the right-hand side of (A5) is determined by the 
sign of the term the square brackets. The latter is the same as the sign of 














>  and imposition of a tariff improves welfare. 
Although there is at least a marginal tariff that unambiguously improves welfare, it is 




dX T  — 
i.e., the tariff actually increases imports. This outcome can occur because the increase in safety 
of the pooled  X ,  0 >
dt
d T λ
, increases demand for all  X  (including imports which are 
indistinguishable from domestic production) and the positive safety effect of a tariff can offset 
the negative price effect of the tariff. Note that given an equilibrium with  0 t > , it does not 
necessarily follow that  0 >
dt
dW
. In this case, the term in curly brackets in (A1) remains 
unambiguously positive, but the term in square brackets is not unambiguously negative since it 
includes the positive value of the specific tariff. 
 
A2. Quota  
In contrast to a tariff that can actually raise imports, imposition of a quota on  * X  at an un-
restricted un-COOL trade equilibrium is an unambiguous trade restriction. Hence, we now show 
that at any unrestricted un-COOL trade equilibrium, there exists a quota on  * X  that reduces 
imports and raises welfare. As noted in the text, total Z  purchased in the COOL equilibrium is 
less than Z  purchased in the un-COOL equilibrium.    32
Consider a quota in the latter that restricts  * Z  to  ** * CC TT Z ZZ ZZ =+ − < . It is assumed 
the quota amount of  * X ,  */ * Z λ  is purchased at world price  * P , mixed with domestic 
production and then sold to consumers. Price ( q P ) of both imported  X  and domestic  X  ( q X ), is 
determined by supply equals demand given the quota and domestic production determined 
by q q P X C = ′ ) ( . Profit on the quota purchase and resale (* ) * q PP X −  is returned to the 
consumer. The general expression for welfare given in (22) is unaffected. To distinguish pooled 












                ( A 6 )  
Where superscript d denotes supply of Z  or  X  from domestic sources and superscript * denotes 





























                 ( A 8 )  
Equations (A7) and (A8) define two relationships between  p λ  and  q P  that must hold in 
equilibrium. Each individually defines a relationship  ( ) qp P λ . It is straightforward to show by 
differentiation that for both (A7) and (A8),  ( ) qp P λ  is upward sloping, raising the question of 
whether they intersect and the nature of that intersection. Note, however, that by choice of  * Z , 
() *, * P λ  satisfies (A7): From the unrestricted, un-COOL trade equilibrium, () *
S
T X PZ λ = , 
** TC C Z ZZZ +=+   and from the COOL trade equilibrium condition (17), it then follows 
() *, * P λ  satisfies (A7). In contrast, at  * P , since  ( ) *
S
T X PZ λ =  but  ** T Z Z < , it follows that 
p λ  in (A8) corresponding to  * P must exceed  T λ . Denote this value of  p λ  by  *8 p λ . Since both 
curves are strictly upward sloping () *8,* p P λ  satisfying (A8) lies below (A7) at  *8 p λ .    33
At  p λ λ = , there is finite  q P  that satisfies (A7): By selection of  * Z  and the fact  TC Z Z < , 
it follows that  * * * C C T C Z Z Z Z Z Z + = + > + . The COOL market equilibrium implies at the 
point () ,  C P λ , the left-hand side of (A7) (equal to  *) ( Z Z u C + ′ ) is less than the right-hand side 
(equal to  *) ( C C Z Z u + ′ ). At () , * P λ , the left-hand side of (A7) (greater than  *)) ( T T Z Z u + ′  
exceeds the right-hand side (less than  ) / ) ) 1 ( * ( T T L P λ λ − + ). Hence, there exists P  ,  * C PP P < <   
such that (λ,  P  ) satisfies (A7). Given  * Z >0, there is no  q P  that satisfies (A8) at  p λ λ = . For 
(A8),  q P →∞ as  p λ λ → .  
From: (a)  () qp P λ  strictly increasing for both (A7) and (A8); (b) ( ) *8,* p P λ  satisfying (A8), 
but lying below (A7) at  *8 pT λ λ > ; (c) ( ) ,P λ   satisfying (A7) for  * C PP P < <  ; and (d) for (A8), 
q P →∞ as  p λ λ → , it follows there exists ( ) , pq P λ
 
, jointly satisfying (A7) and (A8) and 
characterized by  Tp λ λλ <<

 and  * qC PPP < <

. 
Letting  T W  and  q W  denote welfare in the original un-restricted un-COOL equilibrium 
and the new quota-constrained equilibrium respectively, then, using (22) rewritten in terms of Z , 
letting  q Z  denote domestic production of Z  under the quota, and noting since  * q PP <

,  Tq Z Z <  
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The first seven terms in  T W  and  q W  are identical. Combined, the last three terms of  T W  are 
strictly negative since by selection of  * Z , 
*




Z Z u T
− +
= + ′ and  0 < ′ ′ u . Combined, 




























, the combined positive sign of the final three terms in  q W  follow from 
0 < ′ ′ u and  0 > ′ ′ c . Hence  qT WW > . 
 
Appendix B: If an interior maximum of W  in (22) exists, then it is a global maximum. 
 
Since u′ and C′are monotonic, (23) and (24) imply that if an interior maximum exists, it 
is unique. Assuming the autarky equilibrium is not a corner, a corner solution to (22) defined by 





. Similarly, assuming a market of only imports 








Suppose a critical point ( 0, * 0 d XX >> ) exists satisfying (23) and (24). Then, from the 
autarky solution compared with (23): 
0 ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( = ′ − − − ′ A A X C L X u λ λ λ   a n d                ( B 1 )  
(* * ) ( 1 ) ( ) 0 dd uX X L C X λ λλ λ ′′ +− − −=  
Since  0 > ′ ′ C  and  0 * > X  and  0 < ′ ′ u ,  dA X X <  and  ( * *) ( ). dA uX X uX λ λλ ′ ′ + <  It then follows 
from (24): 






Let  X * denote the level of imports that maximizes W  given that  0 d X = . Again assume a 
critical point ( 0, * 0 d XX >> ) satisfying (23) and (24). Then   35
() ( 1) *( 1 * )
(** )
*





′ +− +− ′ ==   or              (B2) 
(** )( 1 ) ( ) 0 d uX L C X λλ λ ′′ −− − =                  ( B 3 )  







> . Thus, if an interior maximum to W  exists, it 
dominates corner solutions.  
 